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Abstract
This paper examines how internal capital flows inside multinational banks cre-
ate global financial interconnections, relying on a novel database on foreign banks
operating in South Africa. Using the event of the East Asian crisis, I find that
foreign affiliates’ balance sheet face “reversal of fortune” when other members of
their banking group need large amounts of internal capital to cushion capital losses,
leading to an abrupt reallocation of internal capital across countries. At the same
time, an increase of the volume of internal funding received is shown to cause an
expansion of credit to the local private sector.
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1. Introduction
It is well-documented that global banks contribute to international shock transmission
via cross border lending (see for instance Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Shin, 2012). But
global banking has taken another form over the recent decades with the expansion of banks
abroad via branches and subsidiaries, especially the expansion from and to developing and
emerging economies, as countries have opened up their banking sector to foreign investors
(Claessens and Van Horen, 2014). Multinational banks operate internal capital markets
through which they (re-)allocate capital between their headquarters and their different
foreign affiliates in response to financial or real economic shocks. As internal funding
reallocation can alter the funding position of a bank’s affiliate, this may in turn lead
to adjustments in foreign affiliates’ lending in their host market, thus creating another
channel of international transmission of shocks.
This research examines how global financial interconnections arise through the flows
of internal capital inside multinational banking groups by using a unique dataset con-
taining information on internal capital transfers from and to subsidiaries. It analyzes the
exchanges of internal capital between foreign affiliates of multinational banks located in
an emerging economy, South Africa, and their headquarters. Focusing on the event of the
1997 Asian financial crisis I estimate a difference-in-difference model and find that South
African affiliates belonging to banking groups with high exposure to East Asian crisis
countries experienced a significant drop in their net internal funding position during the
crisis, relative to South African affiliates of less exposed groups. This result suggests that
the parent bank of more exposed groups reallocated capital away from South Africa to
support their affiliates in East Asia. The analysis also shows that the effects of internal
capital reallocation gradually dissipates over time: two years after the onset of the crisis,
most of the effects had disappeared. The results are robust to collapsing the panel into
one pre- and one post-shock periods to avoid serial correlation problems (see Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004). Finally, I proceed to examine the link between the re-
ception of internal funding and the expansion of local bank credit, using an instrumental
variable technique. I find a positive impact of internal funding on bank credit expansion
to the private sector, suggesting that foreign affiliates do not only use this capital to
acquire government securities or to invest abroad, as it has often been reported in Africa
(see Demetriades and Fielding, 2012; Andrianova et al., 2015; Beck, Maimbo, Faye and
Triki, 2011), but also “pass it on” to the local economy by expanding their domestic
lending.
The fact that multinational banks manage liquidity on a global scale has implications
for policy-making as banking integration via the internal banking channel may make
host countries either more resilient or more susceptible to financial shocks. For instance,
Karam, Merrouche, Souissi and Turk (2014), using data from U.S. banking groups have
shown that the activation of internal liquidity support measures in reaction to a reduced
access to external funding help mitigate the negative effect of a credit rating downgrade
on lending. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) have also used data on U.S. banking groups to
examine the international transmission of financial shocks at multinational banks through
their internal capital markets. They find that affiliates in locations considered as impor-
tant investment locations are relatively protected from internal capital reallocations while
affiliates that are important funding locations are more extensively used to buffer shocks.
The magnitude of these impacts can be large. For instance, Schnabl (2012) exploits the
1998 Russian default as a negative liquidity shock to international banks and analyze
its impact on bank-to-bank lending to Peruvian banks and on bank lending to Peruvian
firms. He found that among Peruvian banks that borrow internationally, the transmission
of liquidity shocks by arm’s length lenders is stronger than the transmission by owners
(through internal capital markets). His analysis shows that domestically owned Peruvian
banks with international bank-to-bank loans reduce lending by 8.2% relative to foreign-
owned banks. Locally funded Peruvian banks are the least affected. Similar results were
obtained by Chava and Purnanandam (2011) on the effect of the 1998 Russian crisis
on the U.S. banking system, with rated bank-dependent firms experiencing larger cut
in capital expenditures and valuation loss as compared to their counterparts who have
access to the public debt markets. Similarly, Ongena, Peydro´ and Van Horen (2015) find
that internationally-borrowing domestic and foreign-owned banks in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia contracted their credit more during the global financial crisis than locally-
funded domestic banks. As such, previous research has shown how the heterogeneity
across the affiliates of a same group and their differential treatment during reallocations
of internal capital affect the intensity of the transmission of shocks to host countries.
In addition, the intensity of the international propagation of financial shocks through
the banking channel depends on both the dependence of domestic banks on cross-border
lending and the dependence of domestic firms on bank funding.
As direct empirical evidence on internal capital markets have so far been limited to
groups from the same country of origin, this has precluded an analysis of the competitive
advantage provided by internal capital flows to subsidiaries operating in a same host
country but with different conditions in their home country and the other countries
where their group are present. These new data allow me to examine how macroeconomic
conditions in the countries where a group is operating affect the volume of internal capital
received and transfered by the South African affiliates from and to their group.
South Africa as a host country is a particularly appropriate place to examine the issue
of internal capital allocation for two main reasons. First, being an emerging economy its
external capital markets are not as developed as those of developed economies, and as
such internal capital might be an important source of funding for foreign banks. Second,
a large variety of foreign banks operate in South Africa, both from developed and emerg-
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ing countries, with important heterogeneity in terms of home countries’ macroeconomic
conditions and groups’ international exposure. In particular, it is an interesting setting
to examine how a banking crisis in a developing/emerging region (East Asia) impacts the
funding position of foreign banks in another emerging economy (South Africa).
This paper makes three contributions. First, it contributes to the empirical literature
on the benefits of internal capital markets for banking firms (De Haas and Van Lelyveld,
2010, Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012, Cremers, Huang and Sautner, 2013; Karam, Mer-
rouche, Souissi and Turk, 2014) by relying on direct internal transactions, instead of
indirectly relying on an investment-cash flow sensitivity approach (e.g., Hoshi, Kayshap,
and Scharfstein, 1991) or a comparative analysis of domestic and foreign multinational
firms (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010). Indeed, due to data constraints, much of the
empirical evidence on the functioning of internal capital market has been indirect, based
on comparisons between the investment behavior of conglomerates and that of stand-
alone firms (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Campello, 2002);
or on the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent
firms (Gertner, Powers and Sharfstein, 2002). A small but growing empirical literature
has emerged recently thanks to the availability of new databases providing direct evi-
dence on internal capital market practices. For instance Cremers, Huang and Sautner
(2013) have examined internal capital allocation in banking with data on a retail banking
group in which bank members cannot access the external capital market. Most recently
Almeida, Kim and Kim (2015) have examined capital reallocation among firms in Korean
business groups (Chaebols) in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the
consequences of this capital reallocation for the investment and performance of chaebol
firms. This paper contributes to this new empirical literature by examining flows in both
directions from parents to affiliates and vice versa. It shows that, as a consequence of
the East Asian crisis, not only did parent banks highly exposed to East Asia cut their
lending to South African affiliates but the South African affiliates also started to lend
more to their parents.
Second, it examines internal lending in an international setting, focusing on affiliates
of companies from different countries of origin, while the most recent empirical literature
has examined internal capital markets inside groups from a single country of origin (for
instance, Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012, and Karam et al., 2014, examined U.S. banking
groups, Frey and Kerl, 2015 examined German banking groups), or focused on a single
multinational conglomerate (Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes and Sautner, 2013), while this data
set includes banking groups from continental Europe, the U.S. and emerging countries.
In so doing, this research contributes to the international finance literature on global
financial interconnectedness. In particular, it complements the research of Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2012) on internal capital markets inside US multinational banks during the
last financial crisis, by showing how financial crises abroad can impact differently foreign
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affiliates of multinational groups located in the same host country and how internal capital
might be a source of competitive advantage for foreign affiliates, over domestic banks or
other foreign subsidiaries.
Third, it extends previous research on the internal fund channel for bank credit by
using data on the volume of internal capital received by the affiliates, while previous
research has relied on comparisons between credit growth of foreign affiliates of multi-
national banks and of domestic banks. (Houston and James, 1998; De Haas and Van
Lelyveld, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2014; Popov and Udell, 2012; De Haas, Korniyenko, Pivo-
varsky, Tsankova, 2015). In that respect, it follows the work of Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2012) which identifies a funding shock to branch parents and then examine the impact
on the US branches’ balance sheets, in particular in terms of their lending activity.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the re-
search hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data and provides some descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. The results are presented in section 5 and sec-
tion 6 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Research hypotheses
Following the approach of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), I rely on the inter-
state banking model developed by Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) to examine internal
capital allocation by multinational banks. Morgan et al. (2004) extend the Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1997) model to a two-state version where capital can flow between the two
states. This model was initially developed by Morgan et al. (2004) to investigate how
integration of bank ownership across states in the U.S. in the early 1980s affected economic
volatility within states. The authors compare the impact of collateral and bank capital
shocks under an interstate banking regime, where capital can flow freely across states,
versus an intrastate regime, where capital flows across states are restricted. Building
on Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), their basic model comprises risk neutral firms, banks
and investors. Firms choose between a good project and two bad projects, with one
bad project having higher private benefits to the firm than the other. Furthermore,
the good project has a relatively higher likelihood of success than the two bad projects,
and all the projects return R if they succeed, 0 otherwise. Through monitoring banks
can prevent investments with large private benefits for the firm to occur, but not those
with small private benefits. As such, banks incur monitoring costs and they must invest
enough of their own capital in the project to be credible monitors. Firms borrow both
informed capital from the bank and uninformed capital from investors. The authors
show that in the interstate model, where informed capital can move freely to equalize the
equilibrium rate of return in informed capital markets, bank capital shocks have a smaller
impact on investment than in the intrastate model, while the impact of firm collateral
shocks gets amplified (see appendix in Morgan et al. (2004) for proofs). This model can
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easily be adapted to an inter-country setting to examine the international allocation of
internal capital by multinational banks. In such a setting, multinational banks are capital
constrained and risk neutral and they re-allocate liquidity (intrabank deposits and loans)
between countries in reaction to financial or real-economic country-specific shocks to
equalize the rate of return on (bank) capital across countries. The model generates two
propositions.
The first proposition is that a collateral squeeze in country A will have a negative
impact on bank lending in that state because the decrease in the rate of return on capital
after the collateral squeeze will lead to a capital flight to the bank in country B1. The
idea is that a weak demand in country A, due to declines in borrower wealth or collateral,
will lead to an outflow of capital from country A to country B, where the rate of return
on capital is higher (Morgan et al., 2004). A collateral squeeze could be related to real-
economic shocks such as a sharp reduction in economic growth in the country of operation.
The parent bank reallocates its capital where it is more profitable, from low-return to
high-return countries: this is the “investment” motive or “substitution effect” (see De
Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010)).
In this situation, the reallocation of internal capital by multinational banks may
amplify business cycles, the group transferring more funds to foreign affiliates located in
host countries with strong macro-economic environments and lending opportunities.
The second one is that multinational banks re-allocate capital between countries in
reaction to financial shocks that reduce sharply a bank’s capital or funding base to ensure
that the return on capital remains equal in both countries. For instance, a parent bank
may also provide intra-bank loans to its subsidiary if its capital base is squeezed during a
systemic banking crisis in the host country. As a consequence of this extra capital inflow,
bank lending in country A decreases by a lower amount than in the situation where there
would not be extra capital available from another state2. The intuition is the following:
a reduction in bank capital in country A, due to an exogenous shock, increases returns on
bank capital in A, which attracts additional bank capital from country B and eventually
equalizes rates of return on capital between the two countries (Morgan et al., 2004). This
is the “support motive”. Furthermore, and as an extension of this proposition, a capital
squeeze faced by affiliates located in the other countries of operations of the banking
group, such as may occur during systemic banking crises, should lead to a reallocation of
internal group funding away from foreign affiliates in non-crisis countries to support for-
1Similarly to proposition 1, this reduction in informed capital available to firms is exacerbated by
a reduction in uninformed capital, due to the reduction of pledgeable income that can be promised by
firms to uninformed investors.
2The authors also show how this positive effect on lending is reinforced by the smaller reduction in
pledgeable income that can be promised to uninformed investors by firms in country A, given that the
amount lent by banks to firms in country A decreases less.
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eign affiliates located in countries where the crisis is occurring. The existence of financial
inter-linkages between entities of a same group leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The quantity of internal group funding to a foreign affiliate de-
creases when other group affiliates face a systemic banking crisis.
Finally, the mechanism that underlies both the support and investment motives is the
group’s response to a variation in its foreign affiliates’ investment prospects or solvency,
ceteris paribus, through the channel of internal capital. In other words, foreign affiliates
use internal capital to compensate for a reduction in their capital base, to profit from
higher return on capital in their host country or, more generally, to compensate for the
insufficiency of available external capital.
Hypothesis 2 An increase in (net) internal funding to a foreign affiliate leads
to an expansion of this affiliate’s lending in its host country,
ceteris paribus.
In the next sections, I present the data and empirical strategy on which I rely to
examine directly the functioning of internal capital market inside multinational banks.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data
In this paper, I use a novel database on banks operating in South Africa with detailed
balance sheet data, including information on internal loans and deposits from and to the
banking group. The data on internal funds come from the central bank of South Africa
(Resbank). The Resbank requires all banks operating in South Africa to provide detailed
balance sheet information on a monthly basis. The banks have to disclose information
on group bank loans and deposits, under both assets and liabilities categories. This
data, collected under the format Banks DI900 Returns is available from January 1993
to December 2007. After this date, the reporting format changes (BA900), with the
categories “bank group funding” (funding received from the banking group of the foreign
affiliate) and “interbank funding” (funding obtained through the interbank market) being
merged into a single category, and it becomes impossible to isolate the stock of internal
bank funding (see Table A.1 for an overview of a simplified DI900 reporting format of the
Resbank). Therefore, I only use the files for the 1993-2007 period. The data is stored in
separate excel spreadsheets for each month and each bank. I only compile the information
for the end-of-quarter months of March, June, September and December, as the other
data it is matched to is only available on a quarterly basis. This information is available
to the public on the website of the Resbank (http://www.resbank.co.za) but to the
best of my knowledge, this data on internal loans and deposits have never been explored
for research on internal capital market.
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This dataset is completed by financial and ownership information on banks from
Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database. Banks’ ownership is defined as follow: I use
the global ultimate owner indicator of BankScope database and update it using the same
definition by looking on banks’ websites when the information is missing in BankScope.
A company is an Ultimate Owner (UO) if it controls at least 50.01% of the entity and has
no identified shareholders or if its shareholder’s percentages are not known. For banks
which have a dispersed ownership and for which there is no ultimate owners controlling
at least 50.01% of the company, I then determine the country of origin of the bank based
on the country of the owner with the highest percentage of shares.
I obtain a panel of 28 foreign banks’ affiliates. However, the panel is unbalanced
and the sample size changes over time, with a minimum of 10 banks in 1994q1-1995q2
and a maximum of 23 between 2003q4-2004q4. In the empirical analysis (which focuses
on the group of foreign banks) I use both the unbalanced panel and a balanced panel
of firms that are present over the whole estimation period to test the robustness of the
results to entry and exit of banks. Figure A.1 in the Appendix maps the geographic
distribution of the country of origin of banks operating in South Africa. In the sample,
67% of the banks are global multinational banks from developed countries (henceforth,
Global MNB) and 33% are multinational banks from emerging countries (henceforth,
Emerging MNB). 81% of these banks are commercial banks or saving banks while the
rest are either investment banks or securities firm. 67% of these foreign affiliates are
organized as foreign branches, and 33% as subsidiaries. These banks have a unique bank
identification number provided by the Resbank. The names of some of the banks in the
sample have changed over time due to mergers, acquisitions or divestments at the group
level (for instance ING Baring became ING in 2004), but the unique number ensures that
we can follow the same bank over time. For mergers or acquisitions between banks in
South Africa, the acquiring bank keeps its identification number, while the target bank
ceases to report financial information. Mergers and acquisitions may overstate the role
of internal capital market in the expansion of domestic lending; however, over the sample
period mergers and acquisitions mainly concern domestic banks which are not the focus
of the empirical analysis. The list of foreign banks’ affiliates presented in Table A.3 in
the Appendix shows that the sample includes some of the largest commercial banking
groups from Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Barclays, HSBC, Standard Chartered and
from Europe, such as ING and Societe Generale as well as important emerging banking
groups, such as Bank of China and State Bank of India. As such, although this study
focuses on one single emerging country, South Africa, the group of banks represented
includes some of the largest banking groups in the world, therefore providing a relatively
representative image of how large banking groups allocate internal funds to their affiliates
in emerging countries.
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3.2. Measuring internal group funding
I use two main variables to examine internal capital markets. The first variable,
internal funding is a liability item reported on the balance sheet and indicates the funding
that the bank owes to its group, either in the form of deposits or loans. In Table A.1 in the
Appendix, internal funding corresponds to the sum of items [A], [B], [C] and [D]. Loans
or deposits denominated in foreign currency are reported in South African Rands so there
are no currency conversion issues. The reporting banks also make deposits and loans to
the rest of the group, reported under item [E] in Table A.1. This corresponds to internal
lending and it is reported as an asset item on the bank balance sheet. The difference
between internal lending and internal funding indicates the net internal funding position
of the affiliate in relation to its group. If the net position is positive, the affiliate is a net
receiver of internal funds from its group. If it is negative, the affiliate is a net provider of
internal funds to its group. I present below the calculation of these two variables:
internal funding = internal loans + internal deposits (1)
net due internal funding = internal funding (liabilities)
− internal lending (assets) (2)
3.3. Descriptive statistics
In this section I examine the funding model of banks operating in South Africa to
understand the role played by internal funding. Specifically, I evaluate the importance
of the group as a source of funding, compared to wholesale funding and customer de-
posits. I also examine the net internal funding position of the banks in relation to their
group. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides detailed definitions and sources of the vari-
ables used in the empirical analysis. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on selected
bank financials for the sample period 1993q1-2007q4. All nominal values are deflated by
the consumer price index (CPI) of South Africa provided by the IMF. In addition, all the
variables coming from the banks’ financial statements are winsorized at the 1% level to
control for extreme observations that could potentially be errors3. The first half of Table
1 groups banks in three different ownership categories: Domestic banks, Global MNB
and Emerging MNB. Domestic banks are included in this table as a benchmark, but the
following empirical analysis focuses on foreign banks. Domestic banks are the largest by
assets, closely followed by Global MNB while Emerging MNB have a much smaller size.
The table shows that the net internal funding position of the three categories of banks is
3The results are robust to different treatments regarding the extreme observations. The estimations
using non-winsorized variable gives qualitatively similar results.
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on average positive over the sample period, indicating that the banks are on average net
receivers of internal funds. The second half of Table 1 groups foreign banks according
to their organizational form: bank branches and bank subsidiaries. The statistics reveal
a much more limited participation of foreign bank subsidiaries in the internal capital
markets of their group compared to foreign bank branches, which is consistent with both
the organizational set up and the legal commitments implied by each structure.
— Table 1 insert here —
Table 2 provides more detailed information on the funding model of the two different
categories of foreign banks (Global MNB and Emerging MNB). It also includes domestic
banks as a benchmark. It presents the different sources of funding of each bank in the
sample, as a percentage of their liabilities for the period 1993q1-2007q4.
— Table 2 insert here —
The table shows that internal funding represented 6% of total liabilities for domestic
banks, while it was 7% for Global MNB and 3% for Emerging MNB, over the sample
period. While clearly not as important as customer deposits, this source is however
non-negligible and often more significant, in terms of amount, than interbank funding.
This suggests that the traditional interbank wholesale market is underdeveloped in South
Africa in comparison to developed countries, and that internal funding might represent
an alternative to interbank funding. On average for all banks, interbank liabilities repre-
sented 5% of total assets over the period studied.4
Finally the second half of Table 2 compares the funding model of foreign bank branches
to that of foreign bank subsidiaries. The difference in organizational structure is trans-
lated into sharp differences in funding patterns. Indeed, the subsidiaries of foreign banks
in the sample are heavily reliant on deposits from other parties (close to 90% of their
liabilities), while interbank funding and internal funding are negligible sources of fund-
ing. On the contrary, the branches of foreign banks have a more balanced funding model,
with internal funding representing around 8% of their liabilities over the sample period.
This suggests that foreign bank subsidiaries are relatively insulated from internal capital
reallocations by their parent bank, while branches are much more financially integrated
to their group.
4As a comparison, in Europe, interbank liabilities stood at around 30% of total assets for banks in
the Euro area pre-crisis (end of 2007 to third quarter of 2008) followed by a drop in the median values
to around 22% in 2011 (European Central Bank, 2012:10).
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4. Estimation strategy
4.1. Hypothesis 1
According to Hypothesis 1, when foreign affiliates experience a sharp decline in their
capital and/or liquidity position during systemic banking crisis they should receive ad-
ditional internal funds from their group to compensate for the capital crunch, leading
to declines in the internal group funding position of other foreign affiliates. I test this
hypothesis in the context of the East Asian crisis.
The East Asian crisis which started in summer 1997 offers a sort of quasi-natural
experiment on the functioning of internal capital market. East Asian economies which had
been attracting significant amounts of short term foreign capital in the early 1990s faced
a large and sudden reversal of capital flows in the second half of 1997 (Radelet and Sachs,
1999). I conjecture that the sudden reversal of capital flows of short term foreign debt
and the reluctance of foreign creditors to extend new loans and roll over existing loans,
which led to a severe banking crisis and the sharp contraction of the economy, created
a funding shock for the south East Asian foreign affiliates of banking groups present
in the region. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) have shown how global banks respond to
such shocks by activating internal capital markets to reallocate funds across locations
in response to their relative needs, while also creating another channel of international
transmission of financial crises (see also Peek and Rosengren (2000) on the role of global
banks in international shock transmission, with the case of Japanese banks in the U.S.).
This should lead to an increase in internal capital flows from foreign banks’ affiliates
located outside the crisis region to those operating in countries affected by the crisis in
order to support the affiliates’ solvency and more importantly their liquidity positions.
Furthermore, even though the subsidiaries of foreign banks in East Asia may not have
been as reliant as domestic intermediaries on short-term, unhedged, foreign currency
denominated debt, they also faced higher funding constraints both on the domestic and
international wholesale market as a result of the crisis. As such, following Hypothesis 1,
I expect the net internal funding position of South African affiliates belonging to a group
very exposed to East Asia to decline more during the crisis, relative to before, compared
to affiliates of groups with little or no exposure to East Asia.
4.1.1. Preliminary graphical analysis
Figures 1 and 2 chart the evolution of the ratio of net internal funding to asset for two
different levels of exposure to East Asian crisis countries: “High East Asian exposure”
regroups foreign affiliates whose banking group has above average exposure to East Asian
crisis countries (more than 2.5% of total assets of foreign subsidiaries ex. South Africa
are in East Asia) and “Low East Asian exposure” regroups banks with below average
exposures. Three observations from these graphs are worth mentioning. The first one
is that until 2000q4, and with the exception of the period immediately after the start
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of the East Asian crisis in 1997q4-1998q1, the net internal funding position of the “high
exposure” group is always higher than that of the “low exposure” group (see Figure
1, which graphs the evolution of the ratio over the long period 1993q1-2007q4). This
suggests that banks are not randomly assigned into these groups. The second one is
that 1998q1 is the only quarter, with the exception of 2007q1, in which the net internal
funding position of the “high exposure” group becomes negative (-3% of total assets on
average), meaning that the South African affiliate of these exposed groups becomes a
net provider of internal funding to its group shortly after the start of the East Asian
crisis. The third one is that despite important and stable differences in the level of
their net internal funding position, both groups follow relatively similar trends in their
reception of internal funds prior to 1997q3 (see Figure 2), which is important given the
common (or parallel) trend assumption underlying difference in difference estimations.
In addition, Table 3 presents summary statistics for key variables for banks with “High
East Asian exposure” and “Low East Asian exposure” prior to 1997q4 (the start of the
East Asian banking crisis). Only the loan-to-deposit ratio is found to be significantly
different between these two groups of banks, with banks with high East Asian exposure
reporting a significantly higher ratio than the banks with low exposure. The classification
into Low and High exposure to East Asia being arbitrary I use instead the continuous
variable “Asian Exposure” as specified in the empirical strategy section.
— Figure 2 and Figure 3 insert here —
— Table 3 insert here —
4.1.2. Model
I estimate a difference-in-difference model on the period 1996q4-1998q3, with a con-
tinuous treatment variable which is the exposure of the parent to the Asian crisis that
started in the third quarter of 1997. The variable Asian Exposure is calculated as the
weighted number of subsidiaries of the same parent (or “General Ultimate Owner” follow-
ing BankScope’s terminology) that are located in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Singapore, South Korea in 19965. The weight is calculated as the assets of the
subsidiaries in the above-mentioned Asian countries divided by the total assets of the
foreign subsidiaries (excluding South Africa) of the parent. This number is thus bounded
below by zero (the group does not have any subsidiary in these East Asian countries)
and above by one (all the other foreign subsidiaries of the group are located in these
East Asian countries). As there was no foreign affiliate in South Africa over the sample
period that was part of a banking group originating from one of these six Asian countries,
5Although this variable has also been calculated for each year in the sample, the weight does not
change for any of the banks over the sample estimation period.
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excluding the assets of the parent bank from the variable of interest is not biasing the
results through under-reporting of exposure to the crisis.
I consider that the East Asian crisis started in the third quarter of 1997, after the
Thai Prime Minister said on the 30th of June 1997 that the Thai baht would not be
devalued, despite the speculative attacks on the currency on the 14 and 15 of May 1997
(see Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Radelet and Sachs (1998, 1999) for a more
detailed macroeconomic analysis of the East Asian crisis). The fact that the crisis was
largely unanticipated and that high levels of capital continued to flow into East Asia
until the very brink of the crisis itself (Radelet and Sachs, 1998) helps the identification
exercise by limiting the potential existence of a pre-crisis trend. I use the continuous
variable “Asian Exposure”, which is an indicator of the weight of East Asian countries
(in terms of assets) in the total foreign exposure (ex. South Africa) of the banking groups.
I estimate the following model:
Net internal funding/assetsit = δt + γi + λAsian Exposurei.Postt
+ δControlsit + εit (3)
For the following variables t is a time subscript (year-quarter) and i is a bank (foreign
affiliate) subscript. The dummy Post is equal to one for the period 1997q4-1998q3, and
zero for the period prior to 1997q4. The estimation period is 1996q4-1998q3, that is,
on the four quarters leading up to the financial crisis and the four quarters after. The
parameter of interest is λ, which measures the difference in the effect of the East Asian
crisis on net internal funding for a one percentage point increase in Asian Exposure6.
Controls. I include Size, calculated as the log of total book assets deflated by the
CPI index as it may affect the degree of integration of the foreign affiliate with its banking
group and drive internal funding and lending. For instance, Gopalan, Nanda and Seru
(2007) show that larger firms are more likely to be providers of funds to their group than
receivers. The loan-to-deposit ratio is also included as a control, as this variable was found
to be significantly different between both groups of banks prior to the onset of the East
Asian crisis (see Table 3). In alternative specifications without bank fixed effects I include
the dummy Branch, which takes the value of 1 if the foreign affiliate is a branch and 0
if it is a subsidiary, to take into account the fact that different organizational structures
translate into varying degrees of centralization of decision-making and restrictions on
internal transfer. As such, I expect this dummy to be positively associated with the
reception of intragroup funding. I include a dummy Commercial which is equal to one if
the main business line of the bank is retail and commercial banking, and 0 if it engages
6That is, a one percentage point increase in the total assets of the subsidiaries in East Asia of the
group, relative to the total assets of all the foreign subsidiaries, ex-South Africa.
12
primarily in wholesale or investment banking. Investment banks may prefer to adopt a
more centralized model to be flexible globally in their liquidity management and services
to large corporate clients (Fiechter et al., 2011).
I include time fixed effects δt to control for variations in local market conditions. I
also include bank fixed effects γi to control for any unobserved time-invariant differences
between bank affiliates. Bank fixed effects also control for differences between foreign
affiliates in the tax regimes of their home country, which could also influence internal
capital allocation.7 The standard errors reported are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the bank (foreign affiliate) level, that is at the (foreign) affiliate level.
4.2. Hypothesis 2
According to Hypothesis 2, an increase in (net) internal funding to a foreign affiliate
should, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in bank credit. I examine whether foreign
banks’ affiliates use these additional internal funds to increase their credit to domestic
firms and individuals in South Africa using an instrumental variable technique.
I want to estimate β, the elasticity of credit to internal funding using the following
empirical model8:
Creditit = βInternal fundingit + γControlsit + δt + γi + εit (4)
However, identifying the causal effect of internal funds on banks’ credit is problematic as
it may be influenced by the same unobservable factors affecting bank credit and therefore
be endogenous. Indeed, apart from internal group funding, banks’ supply of credit is
determined by the demand for credit, by domestic macroeconomic conditions but also by
the availability of external bank funding (customers’ deposit, interbank markets). The
identification problem is that the availability of internal funding may be itself a function
of local (i.e. host country) demand of credit and of local supply of external funding.
The identification strategy relies on the exploitation of an instrumental variable tech-
nique. Following the “support motive” the quantity of internal group funding from a
parent bank to its foreign affiliate should decrease when its subsidiaries in other countries
are faced with a systemic banking crisis in the host country. I use the variable Asian Ex-
posure as an instrument for the volume of internal funding in the bank’s balance sheet in
7Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia and Mart´ınez Per´ıa (2007) have found evidence of a positive and significant
relationship between the top corporate tax rate in a host country and the decision of banks to incorporate
their local businesses as branches, given that it would ease profit shifting across borders to avoid tax
burden. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) also found that internal borrowing is particularly sensitive to
local taxes. Furthermore, different tax treatments by home regulatory authorities of repatriated profits
from overseas could differ between branches and subsidiaries, which would not only influence the group’s
choice of organizational form abroad but also drive the observed variation in internal funding. One way
to control for that is to include home country fixed effects. Given that we already include bank fixed
effects we do not include additional home country fixed effects as these would be redundant.
8Credit and Internal funding are in log so that β is an elasticity.
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the period following the onset of the East Asian crisis. The identification reposes on the
assumption that a multinational bank’s presence in East Asia is uncorrelated with any
other determinant of the foreign affiliate’s local supply of credit, especially uncorrelated
with the local demand of credit, or more generally, with local macroeconomic conditions.
The dependent variable is the outstanding volume of loans to the private sector (de-
flated by the CPI). In DI900 reporting format, the category private sector loans and
advances includes overdrafts and loans to companies, unincorporated businesses, individ-
uals as well as non-profit institutions9.
In terms of controls I include bank’s size and bank’s solvency. In addition, I also
include time fixed effects δt to control for variations in local market conditions, such as
variation in credit demand.
5. Estimation results
5.1. Internal capital in times of crisis - Hypothesis 1
5.1.1. Hypothesis 1 - Results
The tests of the first hypothesis, according to which the quantity of internal group
funding to a foreign affiliate decreases when other group affiliates face a systematic bank-
ing crisis, are reported in Table 4 with three different dependent variables: the ratio of
gross funding to assets, gross lending and the net ratio (funding minus lending). They
indicate that banks belonging to groups more exposed to East Asian crisis countries show
a significant drop in their net internal funding position. Affiliates of banking groups with
higher exposure to East Asian crisis countries experienced a drop in their net internal
funding position of 27.3 percentage points relative to other foreign affiliates (column 3).
In columns (5)-(8) I exclude banks that entered or exited during the 1996q4-1998q3 pe-
riod. I find that a one percentage point increase in Asian Exposure was associated with a
decrease in the internal funding ratio of 14.4 percentage points in the Post period relative
to the Pre period (column (5)), while it was associated with an increase in the internal
lending ratio of 13.4 percentage points (column (5)), leading to an overall decline in net
internal funding of 27.8 percentage points (column (6)). In other words, the South African
foreign affiliates of highly exposed multinational banks both received less internal funding
from their group during the East Asian crisis period than before, and lent more to their
group, relative to the affiliates of less exposed groups. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this
suggests that the headquarters of groups highly exposed to the East Asian crisis countries
altered their internal capital allocation, diverting their internal funds from South Africa
to support their affiliates in East Asia. In columns (4) and (8) I estimate an alternative
model with a lagged dependent variable (net due group funding to assets, one lag), to
9Due to the small number of observations, I have not disaggregated further the measures of credit.
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control for the fact that there may have been differential trends for the growth of internal
funding for banks with different levels of exposure to East Asian countries. These models
with a lagged dependent variable do not include fixed effects as it would require stronger
assumptions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The point estimates of the interaction term
obtained in the two models with a lagged dependent variable (on the entire panel and on
the balanced panel) are both significant at the 1% level and their magnitudes are similar
to those obtained in the fixed effects models. This provides reassurance that the results
are robust to alternative identifying assumptions. Finally, in column (9) I collapse time
into into one pre- and one post-shock periods to avoid serial correlation problems (see
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004, for the methodology) and I control for entry
and exit. The results are robust and the point estimates do not change significantly
between models 3-4, 7-8 and 9.
— Table 4 insert here —
5.1.2. Hypothesis 1 - Robustness tests
As a robustness test, I show that the results are not qualitatively affected by changes
in the end date of the Post period. In Table 5 I investigate further the lasting effects of
the East Asian crisis by extending successively by one quarter the end of the Post period.
I control for entry and exit by only examining the banks that were present during the
entire period 1996q4-2000q3. The signs of the interaction term Asian Exposure*Post are
negative and significant until the third quarter of 1999, however the point estimates de-
crease progressively, from -0.278 for the period ending in 1998q3 to -0.070 for the period
ending in 1999q3. The results indicate that the transmission of the shock was rapid and
it was mostly felt during the first year after the start of the crisis. Two years after, most
of the effects had disappeared. The coefficient on the interaction term turns positive (but
non significant) in 2000q3, three years after the onset of the crisis.
— Table 5 insert here —
One of the limits of this estimation is that Asian Exposure is not randomly assigned.
In addition, and as mentioned before, one of the key identification assumptions of the
difference-in-difference model is the so-called parallel-trend assumption according to which
in the absence of the treatment, the unobserved differences between treatment and con-
trol groups are the same over time. I explore the possibility that a bank belonging to
a group that was more significantly exposed to the East Asian crisis was on a different
internal funding path than those that were less significantly exposed. If this was the
case, my estimates could be capturing such pre-existing differences across the two groups
of banks and not the effect of the East Asian crisis shock on internal funding. First
I perform the following falsification placebo test: I estimate equation (1) over the pe-
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riod 1995q3-1997q2, by lagging the internal funding measure by one year, as if the East
Asian crisis had started in the third quarter of 1996 instead of the third quarter of 1997.
The placebo test is estimated over the period t = (Pre-1,Pre) where Pre is the period
1996q3-1997q2, the same as in our baseline estimation, and Pre-1 corresponds to the 4
previous quarters, 1995q3-1996q2. The results are presented in Table 6 in columns (1)
and (2). The coefficient on the interaction terms of the placebo “post” dummies and
Asian Exposure are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Furthermore,
these different outcomes are driven by changes in the point estimates themselves. These
results provide some additional reassurance on the validity of the exercise, indicating
that banks that belonged to a group significantly exposed to the East Asian crisis did not
face any differential supply of internal funding prior to the crisis period. I perform two
additional placebo tests. The second placebo test is over the period 1994q3-1996q2, as if
the East Asian crisis had started in the third quarter of 1995, instead of the third quarter
of 1997. This is an additional test to check that there were no trends, up to two years be-
fore the crisis, that would explain the results. The coefficient on the interaction terms in
columns (3) and (4) are positive and not significant at the 5% level, which further shows
that there were no pre-existing trends in the supply of internal funding between the two
groups prior to the start of the East Asian crisis. The last placebo test is over the period
1997q2-1999q3, as if the crisis had started a year later, in 1998q3. The coefficients on the
interaction terms for both panels (columns (5) and (6)) are positive and significant. This
shows that a year after the crisis, exposed banks had started to recover, with positively
increasing net internal funding positions.
— Table 6 insert here —
5.2. From internal loans to domestic credit - Hypothesis 2
5.2.1. Instrumental variable and first stage
In this section I provide a test for Hypothesis 2, investigating the impact of the
reception of internal funding on banks’ credit. According to Hypothesis 2, an increase
in (net) internal funding to a foreign affiliate should, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase
in bank credit. I examine whether foreign banks’ affiliates use these additional internal
funds to increase their credit to domestic firms and individuals in South Africa using
an instrumental variable technique. I have performed a preliminary Hausman test for
endogeneity of the variable internal funding which rejected the null hypothesis of the
exogeneity of this variable at the 5% confidence level. I use the bank’s exposure to East
Asia as an instrument (Asian Exposure). The results of the first stage are reported
in Table 7. For the instrument to be valid it needs to be relevant and to satisfy the
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exclusion restriction. The first stage shows that the coefficient on the variable Asian
Exposure is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Models (1)-(5) cover
different periods after the onset of the Asian crisis, from 1997q4 to 1999q3 (model 1), to
1999q4 (model 2), to 2000q1 (model 3), to 2000q2 (model 4) and to 2000q3, a three-year
period (model 5). The coefficient on Asian Exposure is significant at the 1% level in all
three models, but the F-stat varies depending on the period considered, decreasing from
21.28 to 3.75 as the negative effect of the East Asian crisis on the net internal funding
position of exposed banks progressively diminishes.
— Table 7 insert here —
5.2.2. Hypothesis 2 - Results
The results of the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations are reported in Table 8.
The instrumented variable is the (gross) volume of internal funding in Panel A and the
net amount of internal funding due to the group (Panel B).
— Table 8 insert here —
In Panel A, the IV estimates of the gross volume of internal funding imply that a 1%
increase in the outstanding volume of internal funding results in a 1.5% increase to 2.7%
increase in loans to the private sector, depending on the period considered. The effects
progressively decrease as the period since the onset of the East Asian crisis is longer. The
F-stat (Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald rk F statistic) also decreases as time passes
since the beginning of the crisis. In panel B, the dependent variable is the net volume
of internal funding due to the group. The coefficients are also positive and significant
at the 1% level. In net terms, a 1% increase in internal funding leads to a 1.3% to
2.0% increase in loans to the private sector. To sum up, these results using instrumental
variable technique provide evidence that an increase in the reception of internal capital
has a positive impact on banks’ lending to the private sector. In other words, when
foreign affiliates receive more internal funds from their group they expand their loans to
the private sector in South Africa. This confirms the second research hypothesis.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Exploiting a novel dataset containing information on internal funding received and
sent by banks located in South Africa to their parent group abroad, this research has pro-
vided evidence on the existence of support motives for internal funding as multinational
banks reallocate capital away to support their subsidiaries facing financial specific-(host)
country shocks. However, this also implies that foreign affiliates’ balance sheet is not im-
mune to “reversal of fortune” when other parts of their banking group need large amount
of internal capital to cushion capital losses, as this reallocation of capital divert internal
funding to other affiliates. I document this mechanism by examining the impact of the
East Asian crisis, which resembles a “quasi-natural experiment”, on internal allocation of
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capital. The results show that South African foreign affiliates of banking groups highly
exposed to East Asian economies experienced a significant drop in their net internal
funding, as a percentage of their asset, during the crisis.
This research has also explored the link between internal capital and bank credit,
using instrumental variable technique. It has shown that an increase in internal funding
received by a bank affiliate has a positive impact on its supply of credit to the local private
sector. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that foreign banks expand their loans
to the local private sector when they receive higher volumes of internal funding.
The evidence of a support motive to internal funding is particularly important for
developing economies where sources of wholesale funding are limited and capital markets
are underdeveloped. Furthermore, these results are encouraging as foreign affiliates use
this extra (internal) capital to expand local credit, whereas it has often been noted that
banks in Africa are highly liquid but do not recycle deposits in the form of loans, preferring
instead to buy government securities or invest abroad (Beck et al., 2011).
A first message of this research is that foreign affiliates have ambiguous effects for the
financial stability of the host country. On the one hand, being part of a foreign group
should reduce the risk of bankruptcy by allowing for the reception of internal capital
from the group. On the other hand, internal capital markets may be a channel through
which financial crises are transmitted from one country to another, when abrupt capital
reallocations inside the group take place. However, the strength of this channel will
partly depend on the legal structure of the foreign affiliate. Indeed, the organizational
form of the foreign affiliate, either as a branch or as a subsidiary will have an impact
on the stability of the banking sector and the local supply of credit through the internal
capital market channel, as branches are more integrated to their group via this channel
than subsidiaries. The choice of a legal structure by a multinational banking group is
influenced by the regulations in the host country, which varies across countries, as well as
by the development of local capital markets and macroeconomic and political risks in this
particular country (Fiechter et al., 2011). A potential policy implication of this research
for bank regulators may be that favoring organization of foreign affiliates as subsidiaries
rather than branches, through specific banking regulations, may reduce the potential
transmission of foreign crises via internal capital markets. One caveat, however, is that
if a banking crisis occurs in the host country a parent is fully responsible for all losses
incurred under a branch structure, while its obligations are only limited to the value of
the invested equity under a subsidiary structure, which makes it more likely to walk away
from the operation (Cerrutti et al., 2007; Fiechter et al., 2011). That said, if a foreign
affiliate has systemic importance for the health of the banking group, its parent is more
likely to support it through transfers of internal liquidity, regardless of its organizational
form (Fiechter et al., 2011).
One of the limitations of this research is that, with the dataset at hand, we only
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observe the internal funding position of one affiliate of a group, but we cannot capture
the funding position of the other subsidiaries or branches belonging to this group. As
such, one can only infer that capital was diverted from one country to another. This
opens an avenue for future research, conditional on access to data, which would consist
in examining internal transfers between the different affiliates of a group.
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Table 1: Summary of selected bank financials
Source: ResBank. Own calculations.
Variable (Winsorized at 1%) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Domestic banks
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 1633 12800 31800 946 25 168000
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 1633 1050 2370 153 1 13000
Solvency ratio 1633 19% 19% 11% 0% 100%
Global banks
Internal funding/total assets 736 5% 14% 0% 0% 90%
Internal lending/total assets 736 2% 6% 0% 0% 78%
Net internal funding/total assets 736 3% 14% 0% -36% 89%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 736 12500 31900 2500 37 168000
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 736 915 2630 136 5 13000
Solvency ratio 736 8% 7% 6% 0% 91%
Emerging banks
Internal funding/total assets 374 2% 11% 0% 0% 80%
Internal lending/total assets 374 0% 2% 0% 0% 33%
Net internal funding/total assets 374 2% 11% 0% -25% 80%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 374 240 178 189 31 1050
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 374 33 16 34 2 101
Solvency ratio 374 20% 16% 13% 4% 98%
Foreign bank branches
Internal funding/total assets 750 6% 19% 0% 0% 370%
Internal lending/total assets 750 2% 7% 0% 0% 100%
Net internal funding/total assets 750 4% 19% 0% -50% 370%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 750 9750 26800 1150 25 168000
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 750 769 2000 126 1 13000
Solvency ratio 750 17% 18% 9% 0% 100%
Foreign bank subsidiaries
Internal funding/total assets 360 0% 1% 0% 0% 19%
Internal lending/total assets 360 0% 1% 0% 0% 10%
Net internal funding/total assets 360 0% 2% 0% -10% 19%
Total assets (in millions of Rands) 360 19400 44500 353 31 168000
Total capital (in millions of Rands) 360 1560 3650 35 7 13000
Solvency ratio 360 12% 9% 9% 1% 73%
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Table 2: Bank funding model (in % of total liabilities)
Note: “Deposits from other domestic parties” include deposits from local governments, the
public and private (financial and non financial) corporate sectors, Insurers, Pension funds,
Households and Non-profit organisations.
Source: ResBank. Own calculations.
Variable (Winsorized at 1%) Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Domestic banks
Deposits from other domestic parties 1,633 62% 29% 67% 0% 99%
Other liabilities 1,633 21% 25% 12% 0% 100%
Global banks
Internal group funding 736 7% 20% 0% 0% 97%
Interbank funding 736 5% 7% 2% 0% 58%
Deposits from other domestic parties 736 55% 28% 64% 0% 99%
Other liabilities 736 28% 26% 18% 0% 100%
Emerging banks
Internal group funding 374 3% 13% 0% 0% 92%
Interbank funding 374 6% 15% 0% 0% 58%
Deposits from other domestic parties 374 52% 37% 56% 0% 99%
Other liabilities 374 36% 37% 13% 0% 100%
Foreign bank branches
Internal group funding 750 8% 22% 0% 0% 97%
Interbank funding 750 7% 12% 2% 0% 58%
Deposits from other domestic parties 750 39% 28% 37% 0% 99%
Other liabilities 750 41% 32% 36% 0% 100%
Foreign bank subsidiaries
Internal group funding 360 0% 2% 0% 0% 23%
Interbank funding 360 1% 2% 0% 0% 21%
Deposits from other domestic parties 360 85% 8% 87% 62% 99%
Other liabilities 360 10% 6% 9% 0% 24%
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Table 3: Comparison of key variables for banks highly exposed to east Asia and
banks with low exposure to east Asia, before 1997q4
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: ResBank. Own calculations.
Variable Exposure less than 2.5% Exposure over 2.5% T-test
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Loans to private sector 187 1,180,145 14 332,428 1.050
Bank’s size 187 13.568 14 14.045 -0.958
Internal group funding (% liab.) 186 0.031 14 0.070 -0.972
Interbank funding (% liab.) 186 0.031 14 0.026 0.401
Bank’s solvency 187 0.113 14 0.108 0.115
Loan-to-deposit ratio 186 1.381 14 24.175 -4.465***
Total capital 187 369,691 14 95,060 -4.465
Net due group funding 187 7,588 14 83,458 -1.315
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Table 7: First stage regressions
This table presents first stage regression analysis of net due internal funding, in log, deflated by the
CPI index. Constants are included but not reported. Both regressions include time and bank fixed
effects. The dependent variable and the bank controls are Winsorized at 1%. Variable definitions are
provided in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity with values
in parenthesis reported beneath.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
From 1997q4 to 1999q3 1999q4 2000q1 2000q2 2000q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian Exposure -307.245** -282.301*** -243.049*** -191.080*** -147.626**
(75.093) (51.257) (62.853) (54.447) (54.838)
Bank’s size 1.396* 1.378** 1.533*** 1.460* 1.621**
(0.598) (0.410) (0.437) (0.651) (0.563)
Bank’s solvency 0.765 0.860 1.268 0.723 1.148
(1.414) (0.973) (1.378) (2.065) (1.619)
Observations 35 42 48 56 62
Adjusted R-squared 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.755
Number of clusters 9 9 9 9 9
First stage F-stat 19.87 10.35 6.55 21.28 3.75
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Table 8: Elasticity of bank credit to internal funding
This table presents the results of OLS and IV estimations of equation (2) over the 1997q4-2000q3
period for the sample of foreign banks’ affiliates. The dependent variable is the volume of loans to
the private sector, in log and deflated by the CPI index in both Panel A and Panel B. In the IV
estimations, the log of internal funding (gross in Panel A and net in Panel B) is instrumented with the
variable Asian Exposure. Constants are included but not reported. Variable definitions are provided
in Table A.2 in the Appendix. All regressions include time fixed effects. The dependent variable and
the bank controls are Winsorized at 1%. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, with values
in parenthesis reported beneath.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. The F-stat is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Wald rk F statistic provided by the
Baum et al.’s (2002) ivreg2 Stata command.
Panel A
From 1997q4 to 1999q3 1999q4 2000q1 2000q2 2000q3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Gross) Internal funding (real, in log) 2.713*** 2.190*** 1.700*** 1.487*** 1.560***
(0.029) (0.208) (0.310) (0.305) (0.343)
Bank’s size -0.253*** -0.021 0.236 0.343** 0.282
(0.024) (0.116) (0.159) (0.157) (0.177)
Bank’s solvency 95.999*** 70.881*** 59.606*** 53.785*** 50.564***
(1.800) (7.710) (10.323) (10.011) (10.023)
Observations 32 38 44 50 56
R-squared 0.336 0.429 0.452 0.507 0.416
Adjusted R-squared 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.216
Number of clusters 8 8 8 8 8
Time FE
First stage F-stat 944.767 266.268 49.088 25.466 17.606
Panel B
Net due internal funding (real, in log) 2.015*** 1.713*** 1.381*** 1.256*** 1.337***
(0.031) (0.141) (0.200) (0.186) (0.214)
Bank’s size 0.711*** 0.646*** 0.756*** 0.891*** 0.782***
(0.054) (0.119) (0.139) (0.134) (0.151)
Bank’s solvency 94.920*** 69.984*** 61.173*** 58.950*** 58.526***
(1.486) (8.963) (9.981) (9.091) (8.461)
Observations 28 34 39 45 50
R-squared 0.802 0.686 0.620 0.610 0.558
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.381 0.381 0.381 0.381
Number of clusters 7 7 7 7 7
Time FE
First stage F-stat 176.651 169.128 59.281 30.102 17.520
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Figure 1: Ratio of net internal funding to asset, 1993q1-2007q4
Source: Resbank, BankScope and own calculations. Quarterly averages for each of the following
three groups of banks: “High East Asian exposure” regroups foreign affiliates which banking group
has above average exposure to East Asian crisis countries (more than 2.5% of total assets of foreign
subsidiaries ex. South Africa are in East Asia), “Low East Asian exposure” regroups banks with below
average exposure, and all foreign affiliates.
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Figure 2: Ratio of net internal funding to asset, pre and post East Asian crisis
Source: Resbank, BankScope and own calculations. Quarterly averages for each of the following
three groups of banks: “High East Asian exposure” regroups foreign affiliates which banking group
has above average exposure to East Asian crisis countries (more than 2.5% of total assets of foreign
subsidiaries ex. South Africa are in East Asia), “Low East Asian exposure” regroups banks with below
average exposure, and all foreign affiliates.
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